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The Selling Real Estate Broker and the
Purchaser: Assessing the Relationship

Residential real property sellers have traditionally employed licensed real estate brokers1 to find suitable purchasers
for their properties. In a typical real estate transaction, the
broker and the seller enter into an agency relationship through
written agreement, thus creating a fiduciary relationship between the seller, as principal, and the broker, as agent. On the
basis of this fiduciary relationship, the broker is required to act
with utmost good faith toward the seller in protecting the
seller's best interest^.^ While the broker's duty to the seller is
clearly recognized, an increasing number of courts have also
recognized a legal duty owed by the broker to the pur~haser.~
The uncertainty of the exact nature of the relationship
between the selling broker and the purchaser has been confusing to those in the real estate industry as well as to the general
public. Understandably, the broker is uncertain as to his duties
because of the legal predicament in which he finds himself. The
broker is obviously aware that as the seller's agent he owes a
fiduciary duty to the seller. In addition, the broker is becoming

1. "Broker," as used in this Comment, refers to a real estate broker, salesperson or licensee.
2.
See, eg., M.S.R., Tnc. v. Lish, 527 P.2d 912, 914 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974) ("Under both the common law and applicable statutes, a real estate agent, in all dealings affecting the subject matter of his agency, has a fiduciary duty to act with
the utmost faith and loyalty in behalf of his principal."). For a more detailed discussion of this good faith requirement, see infia notes 13-22 and accompanying
text.
3.
See, e.g., Funk v. Tifft, 515 F.2d 23, 25 (9th Cir. 1975) (broker who outbid
buyer for property breached fiduciary duty to deal fairly with buyer); Bevins v.
Ballard, 655 P.2d 757, 761-63 (Alaska 1982) (buyer has cause of action against broker for i ~ o c e n t misrepresentation communicated by broker); Easton v.
Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 390 (Ct. App. 1984) (broker has affirmative duty
to investigate property and disclose material defects to buyer); Zichlin v. Dill, 25
So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1946) (broker owes duty to buyer to deal fairly and ethically);
Miles v. McSwegin, 388 N.E.2d 1367, 1369-70 (Ohio 1979) (broker owes duty to
buyer to correct prior, misleading representations concerning condition of property);
Wegg v. Henry Broderick, Inc., 557 P.2d 861, 863-64 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (holding broker liable to buyer for failure to advise buyer of seller's remedies under
land sale contract in event of buyer's default).
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aware of a duty he owes to the purchaser-a duty which remains unclear but appears to be expanding. Both the broker
and the prospective purchaser need direction in understanding
the precise nature of the broker's duties.
This comment analyzes this brokerlpurchaser relationship.
Part I1 reviews existing agency law applicable to a selling broker and explains how this law is reflected in a broker's relationship with a purchaser. Part I1 also discusses possible problem areas arising out of the establishment of an agency relationship between the selling broker and the purchaser, including the need to rely on the court to find an agency relationship,
dual agency, and subagency in Multiple Listing Service transactions. Part 111 reviews the duties owed by the selling broker
t o the purchaser absent the establishment of an agency relationship. In conclusion, Part IV proposes not only that the
broker be required to disclose to prospective purchasers that he
is in a fiduciary relationship with the seller, but also that the
broker be required to conduct a diligent inspection of the property and disclose any material defects to the purchaser.

A. Elements of an Agency Relationship
An agency relationship generally arises when (1)one party
manifests its intention that another shall act on its behalf; (2)
the other party consents to such relationship; and (3) the party
for whom the other acts has the right to control the ultimate
direction of the cooperative e f f ~ r t . ~
The first element is the principal's manifestation of his
intent that the agent act for him.5 In the typical agency relationship, one authorizes another to act on his behalf either by
written or spoken words or by conduct through which another
may reasonably believe that such authorization to act was
given.
The second element requires that the agent accept responsibility to act for the principal.' No specific words are neces-

4.
5.

S e e RESTATEMENT.
(SECOND)
OF AGENCY
§ 1 (1958).
S e e id. $ 15.
See. id. $ 26. Because the primary aspect is the principal's manifestation

6.
that the agent shall act in his behalf, what the principal actually intends is not
important in deciding whether there is an agency relationship. Id. $ 26 cmt. a.
Silence may also be a manifestation of authorization. Id. $ 26 crnt. d.
7.
See id. 8 15 cmt. c.
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sary to find such an acceptance. If the principal communicates
t o the purported agent his desire that the agent act on his
behalf, and the agent subsequently acts as requested without
expressly accepting the responsibility, the principal may reasonably infer from these actions that the agent acted on the
principal's behalf?
The final element requires that the principal has the right
to control the direction of the cooperative effort.' Though the
principal may exercise the right to control either before the
agent acts, at the time the agent acts, or at both times, the
principal need not exercise this right at all.1° To establish an
agency relationship, the principal needs only to exhibit the
right to control the ultimate direction of the cooperative effort,
not a specific act. As a result, the principal may have no control
over the actual physical acts of an agent." As long as the
agency agreement does not specify exactly how the agent is to
perform, the principal may not interfere with the agent's actions which are customarily within the agent's control.12

B. The Agent's Powers and Duties
Once the principallagent relationship has been established,
the agent is authorized both to bind the principal to third parties and to alter the principal's relationships with these part i e d 3 However, these agency powers also give rise to agency
duties. Because the agent is in a fiduciary relationship with the
principal concerning those matters which fall within the
agency's scope,14 the agent must act primarily for the
principal's benefit as t o such matters. These duties include
making reasonable, diligent efforts to accomplish the agency

8.
See id. $ 15 cmt. b, illus. 3.
See id. $ 14.
9.
10.
See id. $ 14 cmt. a.
11. See id.
12.
See id.
13. See id 5 12 cmt. a. In a real estate transaction, however, even the listing
broker does not usually have the power to bind the seller by signing the contract
of sale on behalf of the seller. See, e g . , Holland v. H a ~ a n 456
,
A.2d 807, 817
(D.C. 1983) (well-settled principle that broker cannot bind seller to contract of
sale); Carroll v. Action Enter., Inc., 292 N.W.2d 34, 36 (Neb. 1980) (broker has no
authority to enter into binding contract of sale on behalf of owner).
14.
See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF AGENCY5 13 (1958); see also SNML Corp. v.
Bank of N.C., 254 S.E.2d 274, 280 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) ("An agent is a fiduciary
concerning the matters within the scope of his agency.").
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objectives;15 acting in accordance with the principal's reasonable instr~ctions;'~
exercising the standard of care and skill
common to the locality for those matters within the agent's
scope and using any special skill that the agent may possess;" dsclosing to the principal all material facts relating to
agency matters that are within the agent's knowledge or which
the agent may disco~er;'~
accounting for funds received or
spent in performing the agency's activities;" abstaining from
acting for one whose interests are adverse to the principal'^;'^
avoiding competition with the principal for the agent's benefit
or for a third party's benefit with respect to agency matters;"'
and refraining from disclosing confidential information received
from the principal regarding agency matters.22

C. Application to the Selling Broker's
Relationship with the Purchaser
Determining whether an agency relationship exists between a selling broker and a purchaser requires an application
of the traditional agency elements.
1. Principal manifests intention that agent act on his behalf
First, an inquiry must be made as to whether the purchaser manifests an intent that the selling broker act on his behalf.
p
p

--

-

15.
See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF AGENCY
5 377 cmt. b (1958).
See id. $ 385 cmt. a. Business custom determines what is reasonable. Id.
16.
17.
See id. !j 379(1); see also I. Cohen Sons, Inc. v. Dowd, 84 P.2d 830, 831
(Colo. 1938) (agent who holds himself out as possessing special skills is liable for
losses from failure to possess and exercise those skills); Northern Pac. Ry. v. Minnesota Transfer Ry., 16 N.W.2d 894, 896 (Minn. 1944) (agent owes to principal the
use of such skill required to accomplish the object of employment).
See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF AGENCY5 381 (1958); see also MacGregor v.
18.
Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 99 So. 2d 709, 712 (Fla. 1958) (duty to inform principal of all pertinent fads); Santaniello v. Department of Professional Regulation,
432 So. 2d 84, 85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (duty to inform principal of all fads
within agent's knowledge).
19.
See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF AGENCY
5 382 (1958).
See id. $5 23, 24. An agent may act for a principal when his interests are
20.
adverse provided that the agent discloses the adverse aspect of the relationship to
the principal. Id.
21.
See id. $ 387; see also Ehringer v. Brookfield & Assocs., 415 So. 2d 774,
776 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (agent who furthers his own interests over those of
the principal breaches his fiduciary duty); Mitchell v. Allison, 213 P.2d 231, 233-34
(N.M. 1949) (broker who purchases property for himself rather than his principal
breaches his fiduciary duty).
22.
See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF AGENCY$ 395 (1958). Some matters require
confidentiality even after the agency relationship has terminated. See d.5 396.
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Typically, since no formal agency agreement exists between the
selling broker and the purchaser, one must examine the activities of the selling broker and the purchaser to determine
whether the required intent is actually present.
In a modern real estate transaction, numerous acts by the
purchaser reasonably imply that the purchaser intended the
selling broker to act on his behalf. In a typical transaction, the
purchaser approaches the broker and either inquires about
specific property or discusses generally with the broker the
purchaser's desires and needs. The purchaser seeks the selling
broker's assistance to acquire pertinent information regarding
the specific property or to locate other property in which the
purchaser may be interested. The purchaser relies on the selling broker's expertise not only to ascertain the fair market
value of the property, but also t o determine whether to include
in the offer financing terms, inspection and repair procedures,
and other contingencies. As a result of these communications,
the purchaser reveals to the selling broker some of the most
personal aspects of his financial condition and needs.
The purchaser subsequently authorizes the selling broker
to deliver the offer to the seller on the purchaser's behalf. Once
the seller accepts the offer, the purchaser often seeks and relies
on the selling broker's experience regarding title examination,
financing, inspections, and so forth. Thus, in the typical real
estate transaction, the purchaser's actions reasonably permit
one to infer that the selling broker is the purchaser's agent,
acting on the purchaser's behalf.23

2. Agent consents to an agency relationship
The next question is whether the selling broker's actions
reasonably indicate to the purchaser that the broker is consenting to act on the purchaser's behalf. Whether such consent
exists must be determined from existing circumstance^?^

23.
See Molly M. Romero, Note, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability: Arizona's Emerging Malpractice Doctrine, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 767, 772-73 (1978).
24.
See, e.g., Butler v. Colorado Int'l Pancakes, Inc., 510 P.2d 443, 445 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1973) (franchisee held to be the franchisor's agent when the franchisor
specifically instructed the franchisee to "buy back" the plaintiff's subfranchise and
also instructed the franchisee to harass the plaintiff into selling); Duffy v. Setchell,
347 N.E.2d 218, 221 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (broker may be held to be the buyer's
agent if the buyer requests the broker's assistance in obtaining a particular piece
of property, even though the broker is paid nothing by the buyer and it is expected that he will receive a fee from the seller).
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The selling broker usually suggests by his conduct that he
has consented t o act on the purchaser's behalf. In the typical
transaction, the selling broker endeavors to determine the
purchaser's wants and needs and attempts to match them with
available property. In attempting to locate a property, the selling broker often uses a Multiple Listing Service (MLS).25Once
a property is located in the MLS, the broker provides the purchaser with all the available, pertinent information outlined in
the MLS. Next, the selling broker often advises the purchaser
regardmg the terms to include in his offer relating to condi- tions of title, financing, inspections and repairs, and so forth.
At the purchaser's request, the selling broker then presents the
offer t o the listing brokerz6 and the seller, individuals with
whom the selling broker may be unacquainted. The selling
broker then negotiates with the listing broker and the seller to
establish terms under which the seller and purchaser may
reach agreement. Once the parties enter into the purchase and
sale agreement, the selling broker advises the purchaser of
available financing, prevailing interest rates, reputable inspection companies, and other relevant information. In general, the
selling broker's conduct leads the purchaser to believe that the
broker is acting as the purchaser's repre~entative.~'
3. Principal controls the direction of the cooperative effort
The final question in determining the existence of an agency relationship is whether the purchaser, as principal, has the
25.
A multiple listing service is typically defined a s an arrangement between
independent real estate brokers in a particular locale whereby each member broker
is authorized to sell property exclusively listed by any other member broker.
By agreement between the member brokers, all pertinent listings with the
various members are registered with a central exchange office or bureau
and thereafter disseminated to the other member brokers for their information and action. When a sale of a listed propertyy [sic] is introduced
by any member broker, other than the listing broker, the sales commission is divided between the selling broker, the listing broker, and the central registration office.
Frisell v. Newman, 429 P.2d 864, 868 (Wash. 1967).
26.
A listing broker's "role is merely to procure a n executed listing agreement
BURKE,JR.,LAW OF REAL
and submit it to the MIS for distribution." D. BARLOW
ESTATEBROKERS5 1.15, a t 1:16 (2d ed. 1992). Thus, the listing broker has contraded with the seller as an agent. In contrast, a selling broker in this context is
"the broker who obtains the offer to purchase from the buyer." Romero, supra note
23, 771 n.23.
27.
See generally BURKE,supra note 26, 5 1.5 (discussing the legal mechanics of
the MLS).
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right t o control the ultimate direction of the cooperative effort.
Because the control need only relate to the general course or
direction of the agency, the purchaser need not supervise or
direct the specific steps in the process. Moreover, the purchaser
is not expected t o direct the broker's actions in detail because a
broker typically has greater knowledge than the purchaser over
the specific aspects of the real estate transaction.
In a modem-day real estate transaction, several factors
indicate that the purchaser controls the general direction of the
agency relationship. First, the purchaser is the party that decides which property t o investigate. Second, having examined
the property, the purchaser then decides whether to make an
offer, and if so, the offer's terms. After an offer is made, the
purchaser has the right to withdraw the offer before the seller
accepts it subject to certain limitation^.^' Finally, the purchaser may accept or reject any counteroffer. Therefore, the purchaser exerts his right t o control the general direction of the
relationship by exercising his power t o approve or disapprove
any agreements made during the negotiation process. Throughout the typical brokerlpurchaser relationship, the purchaser
sufficiently controls the direction of the relationship with the
selling broker to establish an agency relationship.

D. Problems Arising from an Agency Relationship
Between the Selling Broker and the Purchaser
Even though the relationship between the selling broker
and the purchaser in a modern day real estate transaction
evidences an agency relationship, several problems arise from
this characterization. First, the purchaser must rely on a court
to find an implied agency relationship; second, the problem of
dual agency arises when the broker acts as agent for both the
buyer and seller; and third, the problem of subagency often
arises in Multiple Listing Service transactions. These three
problems call into question the wisdom of implying an agency
relationship between the purchaser and the selling broker.
1. Purchaser must rely on a court to find implied agency
relationship
Because the selling broker does not usually enter into an
express, contractual agency relationship with the purchaser,
28.

See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF CONTKACTS9 42 (1981).
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the purchaser must rely on a court to make the determination
that an implied agency relationship actually existed between
the parties. This may be a difficult task for a court, especially
in light of several factors which indicate that the selling broker
is already in an agency relationship with the seller.
First, in situations in which the broker is involved in both
listing and selling the property, the seller and the broker enter
into a contractual agency relationship prior to the purchaser's
involvement. Nevertheless, the mere existence of a written
listing agreement between the seller and the broker does not
automatically negate the possibility that the broker may also
represent the p~rchaser.~'
The second factor, and perhaps the
strongest in&cator of an agency relationship between the broker and the seller, is that the seller pays the broker's commission. One commentator has stated:
The seller's responsibility for payment of the commission, and
the buyer's apparent noninvolvement, is strong evidence tending to show that the broker or brokers involved in the transaction are employed by the seller. Absent a strong showing
otherwise, this evidence supports the theory that the broker
owes fiduciary duties solely to the seller.30

Although the commission payment by the seller strongly evidences that the broker is the seller's agent, this factor is likewise inconclusive. Some courts have found the broker to represent the purchaser even though the broker was in fact paid by
the seller.31
29.
See PMH Properties v. Nichols, 263 N.W.2d 799, 802-03 (Minn. 1978) (jury
question as to whether broker was acting for both the buyer and the seller);
Billington v. Crowder, 553 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977) (broker can act
for seller, buyer, or both); Mayes v. Emery, 475 P.2d 124, 128 (Wash. Ct. App.
1970) (agency relationship between seller's broker and buyer arose when the broker
undertook to have an inspection of the property conducted for the buyer); see also
12 C.J.S. Brokers § 31 (1980) ("The question as to whom a broker represents in a
transaction is determinable from the facts.").
30.
William J . Minick, 111 & Marlynn A. Parada, The Real Estate Broker's Fiduciary Duties: An Examination of Current Industry Standardq and Practices, 12
PEPP. L. REV.145, 154 (1984).
31.
See Ramey v. Myers, 245 P.2d 360, 364 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (agency
relationship between the broker and the buyer inferred from the broker and
buyer's friendship and from the broker's advice to the buyer); Banner v. Elm, 248
A.2d 452, 455 (Md. 1968) ("It is not uncommon for a condition of sale to be that
the agent of the purchaser shall be paid by the seller."); Billington v. Crowder, 553
S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977) ("Even though the identity of the party who
is to pay the broker may not be conclusive of the identity of his principal, it is
nevertheless a strong circumstance.").
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2. The problem of dual agency
One problem that arises when courts find that the broker
acted as agent for the purchaser as well as the seller is that of
dual agency. In this situation, the broker takes it upon himself
to represent the best interests of both the seller and the purchaser. Thus, the broker owes both parties the same fiduciary
duty3%d degree of care as he would if he represented each
party separately. The broker must act loyally, fairly, and in
good faith, with respect to both the seller and the purchaser.33
Despite the conflicts inherent in the dual agency relationship, courts have generally recognized the legitimacy of this
relationship provided that the broker make full disclosure to
both parties before the agency relationship is establi~hed.~~
However, making such disclosure and obtaining the consent of
both parties might be difficult given the usual residential
transaction. Typically, no agreement is executed between the
broker and the purchaser before the broker undertakes the
task of locating suitable residential property for the purchaser.
Likewise, obtaining the seller's consent to a dual agency relationship is problematic because a seller who fully understands
the implications of consenting t o a brokerlpurchaser relationship may be reluctant t o disclose t o the broker his true expectations regarding the sale of his property. Consequently, because
the broker may be unable to satisfy the seller's needs, the seller might resist the dual agency arrangement.
For a discussion of the fiduciary duties owed by a broker to his principal,
32.
see supra notes 13-22 and accompanying text.
33.
See, eg., Martin v. Hieken, 340 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960) ("A
broker so unwise as to place himself in the anomalous position of representing
adverse parties must scrupulously observe and fulfill his duties to both."); Investment Exch. Realty, Inc. v. Hillcrest Bowl, Inc., 513 P.2d 282, 284 (Wash. 1973) (en
banc) ("[A] real estate broker owes to his client the duty to exercise the utmost
good faith . . . . Loyalty is the chief virtue required of a n agent." (citations omitted)).
34.
See, e.g., PMH Properties v. Nichols, 263 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn. 1978);
Cogan v. Kidder, Mathews & Segner, Inc., 648 P.2d 875, 877 (Wash. 1982) (en
banc). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF AGENCY
5 392 (1958), which provides:
An agent who, to the knowledge of two principals, a d s for both of them
in a transaction between them, has a duty to act with fairness to each
and to disclose to each all facts which he knows or should know would
reasonably affect the judgment of each in permitting such dual agency,
except as to a principal who has manifested that he knows such facts or
does not care to know them.
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The shortcomings of dual agency are further illustrated by
the requirement that the broker disclose any material facts
that would reasonably affect the principal's decision to buy or
sell the property.35As a dual agent, the broker must consider
whether he is required t o reveal the purchaser's highest price
t o the seller and the seller's lowest price t o the purchaser.
Though the broker is generally permitted to act as a dual
agent, when confidential information such as a statement about
price is given to the agent by the principal, the agency's duty
compels the broker's silence.36
Although legal decisions may allow dual agency, the broker
is put in the precarious situation of having to provide full disclosure to one party without harming the interests of the other.
Because of the opposing goals of the seller and the purchaser,37 the broker will almost assuredly breach either his fiduciary duty owed t o the individual party or his duty t o disclose.

3. The problem of subagency in Multiple Listing Service
transactions
If the agency elements are present in the typical real estate transaction involving a selling broker and a purchaser, a
problem also arises when the listing broker agrees to "cooperate" with the selling broker by sharing the commission in return for the selling broker finding a purchaser who is ready,
willing, and able to purchase the property. Such "cooperation"
refers to the real estate industry's established practice of using

See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF AGENCY8 381 (1958); see also Koller v.
35.
Belote, 528 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (broker did not disclose to the
prospective purchasers the impossibility of securing the best price and terms available while representing the best interests of the seller).
36. The agent . . . is under no duty to disclose, and has a duty not to disclose to one principal, confidential information given to him by the other,
such as the price he is willing to pay. If the information is of such a
nature that he cannot fairly give advice to one without disclosing it, he
cannot properly continue to act as advisor.
8 392 cmt. b (1958) (emphasis added).
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF AGENCY
37.
See Nahn-Heberer Realty Co. v. Schrader, 89 S.W.2d 142, 144 (Mo. Ct. App.
1936).
The interests of the buyer and the seller are naturally antagonistic to
each other. The broker, in undertaking to arrange terms between them, if
he favors the buyer is necessarily disregarding the interest of the seller,
and, if he favors the seller, is necessarily disregarding the interest of the
buyer.
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an MLS, whereby listing brokers agree to pool all listings and
to cooperate with other MLS member-brokers who produce
purchasers for the listed proper tie^.^^ This arrangement clearly benefits both sellers and purchasers by exposing sellers'
properties to more potential purchasers and by affording purchasers a larger selection of available properties. In addition,
the MLS has eased the geographical barrier between purchaser
and seller and enhanced the flow of information and communication between the parties.39
In an MLS arrangement, an agency relationship is obviously recognized between the listing broker and the seller based on
the contractual privity between them. The contract typically
authorizes the listing broker to use the services of other brokers. Therefore, any broker other than the listing broker who
attempts to arrange a sale of the property is considered a subagent of the listing broker. However, since the selling broker
has never been in direct contact with the seller, neither the
seller nor the selling broker is often aware of the fiduciary
relationship that exists between them. Sellers may be surprised
to discover that this relationship actually increases the seller's
liabilities to third parties for misleading statements or omissions relating to the property. Based on agency doctrine, the
seller, as principal, is liable for the misrepresentations made by
his agents and his subagents.*'
Though courts have generally upheld the agency relationship based on a subagency theory?l the effects of this theory
are actually adverse to the purchaser's best interests. Under
this theory, courts have held that both the listing and selling
brokers are in a fiduciary relationship with the seller.42As
38.
See generally Arthur D. Austin, Real Estate Boards and Multiple Listing
Systems a s Restraints of Trade, 70 COLUM.L. REV. 1325, 1328-30 (1970) (discussing the advantages of multiple listing systems).
39.
See id. at 1329.
RES~ATEMENT
(SECOND)OF AGENCY§§ 256-264 (1958).
40.
l Ross, 711 S.W.2d 793, 795-96 (Ark. 1986); Stortroen v.
41.
See, e.g., F e ~ e l v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 736 P.2d 391, 396 (Colo. 1987) (en banc); Givan v.
Aldemeyer/Stegman/Kaiser, Inc., 788 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).
42.
See, eg., Licari v. Blackwelder, 539 A.2d 609, 613 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988)
("A real estate broker acting as a subagent with the express permission of another
broker who has the listing of the property to be sold i s under the same duty as
the primary broker to act in the utmost good faith."); Mersky v. Multiple Listing
Bureau of Olympia, Inc., 437 P.2d 897 (Wash. 1968). I n Mersky, the court stated:
[Tlhere flows from this agency relationship and its accompanying obligations of utmost fidelity and good faith, the legal, ethical, and moral responsibility on the part of the listing broker, as well as his subagents, to

1146 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992

such, this arrangement leaves the purchaser without adequate
representation. Thus, even though the majority of purchasers
undoubtedly believe that the selling broker is representing the
purchaser's best interests, application of the subagency doctrine
makes this belief a delusion.
Though some courts have taken alternative, and arguably
the rule that the selling broker is a subbetter
agent of the listing broker, and thus an agent of the seller,
remains the dominant view.44Therefore, the purchaser must
understand at the outset of the transaction that he is not represented. One way t o provide this information is to impose a
disclosure requirement upon the broker. One commentator
described this suggested communication requirement:

exercise reasonable care, skill, and judgment in securing for the principal
the best bargain possible; to scrupulously avoid representing any interest
antagonistic to that of the principal in transactions involving the
principal's listed property, or otherwise self-dealing with that property,
without the explicit and fully informed consent of the principal; and to
make, in all instances, a full, fair, and timely disclosure to the principal
of all facts within the knowledge or coming to the attention of the broker
or his subagents which are, or may be, material in connection with the
matter for which the broker is employed, and which might affect the
principal's rights and interests or influence his actions.
437 P.2d a t 899 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
43.
See, e.g., Wise v. Dawson, 353 A.2d 207 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975); Blocklinger
v. Schlegel, 374 N.E.2d 491 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465
(Iowa 1985).
In Wise,the court concluded that no agency relationship existed between the
selling and listing brokers, stating that "a multi-list arrangement between listing
and selling agents is not an agency relationship unless clearly proven otherwise."
353 A.2d a t 209. The court reasoned that the local MLS defined itself as an "information exchange"; that the MLS had no provision for control of the selling broker
by the listing broker, as is required in an agency relationship; and that the splitting of the fee commission was no "indicia of agency," because independent contractors split fees as well. Id.
In BlockZinger, the sellers argued that the purchaser, who was a real estate
broker, became their subagent by virtue of an MLS agreement. 374 N.E.2d at 493.
The court, however, found that no fiduciary duty existed between the parties because there was no actual agency relationship because of the MLS agreement. Id.
Referring to the tenuous relationship created by the MLS concept between a seller
and a broker, the court stated that "the business of being a realtor is not one
containing a n element of public interest so as to require him to deal as a fiduciary
with everyone." Id.
In Menzel, the court adhered to the rule that a "real estate broker is the agent
of the party who first employs him or her, and this may be the buyer even though
i t is anticipated the fee will be received from the seller." 362 N.W.2d a t 475. The
court noted that the MLS arrangement meant only that the selling broker would
receive some commission from the listing broker. Id.
BZJRKE,supra note 26, $ 1.6, a t 1:35.
44.
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Brokers could be required by law or regulation to inform
buyers of the agency relationship the broker has directly with
some sellers, through listing agreements, and indirectly with
others, through multiple listing arrangements. The broker
would have to explain that he may not volunteer more information than the owner of the home would have to disclose nor
give advice about the appropriate price or s;ubjective qualities
of the houses in~pected.~'

Requiring the selling broker to advise the potential purchaser that he will be acting solely as the seller's agent would
help clarify the nature of the broker's relationship with the
seller and the purchaser and would assist in overcoming the
misleading and confusing nature of the current system. Other
effects of this disclosure requirement have been outlined as
follows:
The buyer . . . would be less likely to rely unquestioningly on
the broker. Since the buyer would be less likely to rely on the
selling broker, the broker's potential liability for fraud o r
misrepresentation should be lessened-the buyer would be
aware that he must search out new avenues of information
concerning the property. A disclosure form would also benefit
the broker by serving a s a constant reminder that he is the
agent of the seller and must not give the buyer any misleading signals.46

Though such a mandatory disclosure requirement would
likely clarify the brokerlpurchaser relationship, brokers may be
hesitant t o disclose such information t o potential purchasers.47
Advising the purchaser at the outset of the transaction that
neither the listing nor the selling broker represents him may
encourage the purchaser to seek alternative representation.
Though it would likely be more advantageous to the purchaser
to employ her own broker or attorney as her representative,
such a concept works adversely to the selling broker's psychological advantage of getting the purchaser committed in writing
as soon as possible. Nevertheless, a mandatory disclosure re-

Barry A. Currier, Finding the Broker's Place in the Typical Residential Real
45.
Estate Transaction, 33 U . FLA.L. REV. 655, 679 (1981).
46.
Paula C. Murray, The Real Estate Broker and the Buyer: Negligence and the
Duty to Investigate, 32 VILL.L. REV. 939, 951-52 (1987).
47. Joseph M. Grohman, A Reassessment of the SeJling Real Estate Broker's
Agency Relationship with the Purchaser, 61 ST. JOHN'SL. REV. 560, 584 (1987).
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quirement with the potential for broker liability for noncksclosure would cause the wary broker to think twice before violating this ethical and legal responsibility.
Another potential problem with imposing this disclosure
duty upon the broker is that merely revealing the existence of
the subagency relationship between the listing and the selling
broker still fails to provide the purchaser with adequate representation of the purchaser's interest^.^' However, this concern
is somewhat alleviated by imposing a duty upon the broker to
exercise reasonable care to discover and disclose material defects in the property.49
111. THESELLING
BROKER'S
DUTIESTO THE
PURCHASER
ABSENTAN AGENCY
RELATIONSHIP
Even if no agency relationship exists between the selling
broker and the purchaser, the question remains whether the
broker still owes a fiduciary duty t o the purchaser. A fiduciary
relationship is generally created when one party, the purchaser, places trust and confidence in another party, the broker,
because of the broker's superior skill and experti~e.~'
"More
specifically, a fiduciary relationship is created where one party
has expressly reposed trust and confidence in the other; where
trust and confidence, although not express, are implied because
of a past history of fiduciary dealings; or where the very nature
of the transaction is fiduciary."51
Originally, the lack of an agency relationship led most
courts to fmd that the broker owed no fiduciary duty to the
purchaser. The rationale for this conclusion was that the broker, as agent for the seller, stood in the seller's shoes and had
the same relationship to the purchaser as did the seller.5z
However, a number of courts have found that the broker does
owe a legal fiduciary duty to the purchaser even though the
broker and purchaser are not in any agency relationship.

48.
Id. at 585.
49.
For a more detailed discussion of this duty, see infia part IV.
50.
See Fairfield Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kroll, 246 N.E.2d 327, 330-31 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1969) (holding broker to be in fiduciary relationship with elderly purchaser
because broker undertook to obtain financing for purchaser).
51.
Kathryn J. Brown, Expansion of a Real Estate Brokr's Duties: Is Easton v.
Strassburger in Illinois' Future? 5 N . ILL. U. L. REV. 97, 103 (1984) (citing JOJXN
N. POMEROY,
EQUITY
JIJRISPRUDENCE
$ 902 (5th ed. 1941)).
52.
See Paul A. Longton, Comment, A Reexamination of the Real E s t a f ~BrokerBuyer-Seller Relationship, 18 WAYNEL. REV. 1343, 1345 (1972).
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In Harper v. Adamet~?~
the Connecticut Supreme Court
held that the real estate broker breached his fiduciary duty to
the purchaser when he misrepresented the seller's minimum
price and failed to disclose the purchaser's offer t o the seller.54
Although the broker was not the purchaser's agent, the court
concluded that the purchaser had a right t o assume that the
broker would both "deal honestly with him and be faithful to
Because the broker had breached
his principal [the ~eller].'"~
the fiduciary duties he owed to the buyer, the court then imposed a constructive trust on the broker in favor of the purchaser.56The court reasoned that a constructive trust
is most often applied in situations where the relationship
between the plaintiff and the defendant is one which equity
clearly recognizes a s fiduciary. But equity has carefixlly refrained from defining a fiduciary relationship in precise detail
and in such a manner a s to exclude new situations. I t has left
the bars down for situations in which there is a justifiable
trust confided on one side and a resulting superiority and
influence on the other?'

Thus, despite the absence of a principal-agent relationship, the
court clearly recognized that the broker owed a legal duty t o
the purchaser.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Funk v. Tiffts8
that a real estate broker breached his fiduciary duty of dealing
fairly and honestly with a prospective p~rchaser.~'In this
case, the broker failed t o disclose to a prospective purchaser
that he had submitted a subsequent offer for the realty which
superseded the prospective purchaser's offer?' As the court
stated,
When a real estate broker acts as an intermediary between a
seller and a prospective purchaser, he is under a duty to deal
fairly and honestly with the prospective [purchaser]. That
113 A.2d 136 (Corn. 1955).
53.
Id. at 138-39. After purchasing the property through his son, the broker
54.
then sold a small portion of the property at a profit to the buyer, leading the
buyer to believe that the original owner was the seller and had decided to retain
the balance of the property. Id. at 137-38.
Id. at 139.
55.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
515 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1975).
59.
Id. at 25.
60.
Id. at 24.
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duty is breached when the real estate agent outbids the prospective [purchaser] without notice to him before the seller
has acted on his offer.61

In contrast, the dissenting opinion in Funk denied the
existence of a fiduciary relationship between the broker and the
prospective p u r ~ h a s e r .The
~ ~ dissent argued that only those
acts traditionally held to be a breach of an agent's fiduciary
duty such as affirmative misrepresentations, misuse of confidential information, and failure to disclose a conflicting agency
relationship should be the basis of liability." The dissent concluded that
[wlhere the broker is not the agent of the prospective buyer,
where he acts with the knowledge of his principal, the seller,
where there is no misuse of confidential information, where
there is no fraudulent misrepresentation, and where the broker bids more than any of the prospective buyers, there
should be no liability on the part of the broker if the seller
chooses to accept his offer without asking for another round of
bids.64

Many courts have continued to embrace the traditional
view and are unwilling to fmd a fiduciary relationship between
the selling broker and the purchaser.65In fact, even in cases
with fads quite similar t o Harper and Funk, courts have expressly found that no fiduciary duty existed between the broker
and purchaser.
For example, in Klotz v. FauberYG6
the Virginia Supreme
Court refused to hold the broker liable, even though the broker
failed to transmit the purchaser's offer to the seller and purchased the land for himself.67 Likewise, in DiBurro v.

61.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 27 (Wright, J., dissenting).
62.
63.
Id. at 28.
Id.
64.
65.
See Blocklinger v. Schlegel, 374 N.E.2d 491, 493 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) ("Before a fiduciary duty arises it must be proven that a realtor has been employed by
someone and that he is therefore an agent for them."). But see Fairfield Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Kroll, 246 N.E.2d 327, 331 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (agency relationship
still arose even though broker was not employed by buyer).
66.
189 S.E.2d 45 (Va. 1972).
Id. The court stated that when a broker fails to communicate the
67.
purchaser's offer to the seller and subsequently acquires the property herself, the
broker is liable to the purchaser only if the broker purchases the property at a
price equal to or less than the price the prospective purchaser agreed to pay. Id.
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B o n a ~ i a the
, ~ ~ Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts refused to hold the broker liable for breach of a fiduciary duty to
the purchaser. In this case, the prospective purchaser asked
the broker to determine if a particular piece of property was
worth the asking price.69 When the broker learned that the
purchaser was interested in both the seller's property and an
adjoining tract, the broker eventually purchased both tracts
without informing the potential p~rchaser.~'However, because the broker was not in an agency relationship with the
purchaser, the court refused to impose a constructive trust on
the b r ~ k e r . ~ '
Recognition of a fiduciary duty between the broker and
purchaser, in the absence of an actual principahgent relationship, still gives rise to similar duties owed in an agency relationship. Where a relationship is construed as fiduciary, the
broker owes the purchaser the duties of honesty, loyalty, and
full disclosure of material information concerning the property.72
If the broker were t o breach any of these duties, the purchaser would have a cause of action against the broker. In
other words, the broker is in virtually the same position as he
would be in a dual agency situation.73The broker would have
to totally disregard his agency relationship with the seller and
act as agent for both parties. Placing a broker in such a position will almost certainly cause the broker to breach his fiduciary duty to one of the parties. Surely the courts that have
imposed these fiduciary duties on the broker did not intend to
place the broker in such a precarious situation.
Perhaps the courts' willingness to impose a fiduciary duty
on the broker arises primarily from the traditional notion that
the seller's relationship with the purchaser was one of caveat
ernpt~r.?~
Thus, the broker, acting as the seller's agent, was
also bound by the doctrine of caveat emptor. To circumvent the
Because the prospective purchaser had not alleged that his offer equalled or exceeded the price the broker paid, the court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
Id.
68. 71 N.E.2d 401 (Mass. 1947).
69. Id.
70.
Id.
71.
Id. at 402.
For a discussion of these fiduciary duties, see supra notes 13-22 and ac72.
companying text.
73.
For a discussion of the dual agency problem, see supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
74.
Longton, supra note 52, at 1345.
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harsh doctrine of caveat emptor, courts found that the broker
had not only a duty to deal fairly with the purchaser, but also
a heightened duty to deal with utmost trust and confidence-as
a "fiduciary." Though the courts understandably wanted to
protect the purchaser, such a heightened duty may have had
the unintended result of putting the broker in an untenable
legal position.75 What courts today may really mean by the
use of the term "fiduciary duty" is that the broker has the duty
to treat the purchaser honestly and fairly.76Perhaps a better
way t o view the relationship of the broker and the purchaser is
not as a fiduciary one, but as a normal business relationship in
which the broker must not intentionally or negligently mislead
the purchaser.
AND CONCLUSION
IV. RECOMMENDED
SOLUTION

The real estate broker unquestionably owes some sort of
legal duty t o the purchaser in a residential real estate transaction. However, courts at best have been inconsistent in defining
and interpreting the precise nature of this duty. As a result,
the real estate industry and the general public are both understandably confused about the proper relationship between the
broker and the purchaser.
In a typical real estate transaction, the broker is already in
a fiduciary relationship with the seller. Accordingly, an additional fiduciary duty toward the purchaser should not be imposed on the selling broker. The legal imposition of a fiduciary
relationship with the purchaser would put the broker in the
impossible situation of having to act in the best interest of both
parties. Attempts by the broker to act in the best interest of
both the seller and the purchaser may very well result in a law
suit against the broker by one or both parties.
Nevertheless, the broker cannot simply protect the seller's
best interests and ignore those of the purchaser. In the modern
residential real estate transaction involving an MLS agreement, the selling broker will spend many hours with the purchaser. As a result, the purchaser will come to depend and rely

75.
"On one hand, the broker has an established agency relationship with the
seller. On the other hand, the uncertainty of the law leaves a broker in the insecure position of fulfilling vague fiduciary duties toward the buyer in order to avoid
possible future liability." Minick & Parada, supra note 30, a t 167.
76.
See Funk v. Tifft, 515 F.2d 23, 24-25 (9th Cir. 1975) (imposing a fiduciary
duty on the broker to deal honestly and fairly with the buyer).
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on the broker for his professional expertise and for his ability
to provide vital information concerning the property. The broker should therefore recognize a duty to the purchaser to use
reasonable care to make certain that this information is accurate. If the broker fails to use reasonable care in obtaining or
communicating information, the purchaser should have a cause
of action against the broker for negligent misrepresentation.
To satisfy this duty of reasonable care, the broker should
use his professional expertise to discover any material defects
of the seller's property. The broker must not merely rely on the
information provided by the seller concerning the property. The
broker should be required to verify all information received
from the seller by routinely conducting a n independent inspection of the property to discover any information which might
materially affect the property's value or desirability.
The imposition on the broker of a duty to diligently inspect
the seller's property will benefit all parties to the transaction.
Under the current market structure, many purchasers wrongly
believe that the broker is acting in their best interest. Such a
belief is evidenced by the rash of suits against brokers and
sellers for fraud, negligent or innocent misrepresentation, and
simple negligence.?? However, many of these suits could be
avoided if the broker would (1) inform the purchaser, in writing, a t the beginning of their relationship that the broker is in
a fiduciary relationship with the seller, and (2) conduct a diligent inspection of the property to discover and disclose to the
potential purchaser any material defects affecting the
property's value or desirability.
Imposing a duty on the broker to diligently inspect the
seller's property would alert the broker of his duty to the
purchaser-to use reasonable care to avoid misleading the
purchaser. This duty avoids both the dual agency and the subagency problems while still allowing for fair treatment of the
purchaser. This high standard of conduct will not only create a
more honest and ethical environment within the real estate
industry, but will also clarify the duties and expectations of all
the parties involved-the broker, the seller, and the purchaser.

Brett L Hopper

77.

See cases cited supra note 3.

